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INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the Texas Legislature responded to demands for an overhaul of the cumbersome death penalty appeals process and enacted
article 11.071 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.' Although the legis1. See Act of May 24, 1995 (Habeas Corpus Reform Act), 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
319, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2764, 2764 (amended 1997, 1999) (current version at
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (Vernon Supp. 2003)); Ex parte Kerr, 64
S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that the Act made three major
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lature mandated the right to an attorney on post-conviction habeas
corpus review by providing that competent counsel be appointed,2 the
term "competent" has never been defined.' This failure raises the is-

sue of whether an attorney appointed to represent a death penalty
habeas petitioner should be required to meet the constitutional standard of effectiveness delineated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington.4 In its simplest form, the question becomes: are defend-

ants in death penalty cases not only entitled to lawyers, but also entitled to competent lawyers? Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals stayed at least two executions' until the court could address
whether ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel is a cognizable
claim by a habeas applicant.6 In early January 2002, the court held in
Ex parte Graves that even though article 11.071 grants a statutory
right to the appointment of competent habeas counsel, it does not give7
rise to the right to effective assistance of that appointed counsel.
Thus, in Texas, prior habeas counsel's competency cannot be addressed on habeas corpus review.8

This Comment argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
was correct in refusing to engraft a constitutional standard of effective
assistance of counsel to post-conviction habeas corpus review. In
changes in Texas law: (1) It created a unitary system for capital post-conviction review
where direct appeals and habeas review proceed at roughly the same time; (2) It
adopted the abuse of the writ doctrine that generally limits a capital inmate to one
application for a habeas writ; and (3) It provided for the appointment of counsel to
represent capital inmates in their habeas petitions).
2. Habeas Corpus Reform Act, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, § 1, sec. 2(b), 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws at 2764 (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071,
§ 2(b)). Prior to the enactment of article 11.071, the state of Texas did not appoint
attorneys to represent indigent inmates in capital post-conviction proceedings. See
Act effective Jan. 1, 1966, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722, § 1, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317, 344
(current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
3. See Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing that
although article 11.071, section 2(d) requires the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to
adopt rules and standards governing the qualifications of counsel, the court thus far
has not promulgated any standards for the competency of appointed post-conviction
counsel in capital cases), vacated in part by 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997).
4. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691 (1984) (defining the constitutional standard for attorney performance as "reasonably effective assistance" under "prevailing professional norms," and holding that attorney errors will not warrant reversal unless the
error affected the judgment).
5. See Ed Timms, Beazley Stay May Not Be About Age: Quality of Counsel in
Appeal Affects Other Death-Row Cases, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 17, 2001, at
35A (noting that Napoleon Beazley and three additional unnamed death-row inmates received stays pending the court's decision); see also Ed Timms, Officials Ask
for Youthful Killer's Execution, SEAT-rLE TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at A5 ("Legal experts
say that the state appeals court probably issued a stay based on allegations [of] ...
inadequate counsel at one stage in the appeals process .... ").
6. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 104-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that
the issue was whether Graves was entitled to have the merits of his ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel claim heard on a subsequent writ).
7. Id. at 117.
8. See id. at 105.
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reaching the appropriate decision, however, the court failed to provide any guiding standards of competence for appointed capital
habeas attorneys. 9 Specifically, the court did not elaborate on either
the type or amount of qualifications, experience, or ability necessary
for a finding of attorney "competence." The resulting inadequate definition of "competency" for appointed post-conviction counsel in
death penalty cases leaves habeas petitioners without a remedy when
statutorily mandated, post-conviction review is nullified by grossly deficient, appointed counsel.1" The solution lies in providing a standard
of "competence" through a statutory amendment because the specification of binding attorney qualifications will ensure that capital petitioners receive their "one full bite" at the habeas "apple." 1 1
Part II of this Comment provides background information on postconviction state habeas corpus review by illustrating the function of
habeas writs, outlining Texas's statutory writ provisions, and describing the current crisis in post-conviction representation. Part III analyzes the argument for applying Sixth Amendment effective assistance
of counsel to a statutory grant of habeas counsel, explaining that even
though the Sixth Amendment does not apply to post-conviction proceedings, petitioners attempt to claim the right to effective assistance
under the statutory grant of counsel in article 11.071.12 Part IV explains how the doctrines of finality and abuse of the writ converge to
prohibit application of the constitutional effectiveness standard to
post-conviction review. Part V concludes that the appropriate solution to the crisis in post-conviction representation lies in the establishment of qualification standards for the appointment of post-conviction
counsel, which the Texas Legislature should provide via an amendment to article 11.071 itself.
II.

BACKGROUND: POST-CONVICTION STATE HABEAS CORPUS
REVIEW IN CAPITAL CASES

A.

Function of Writ of Habeas Corpus

For centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has occupied an important
place in the review of death penalty convictions and sentences. 13 In
9. See id. at 114, 117 (stating that "competent counsel" refers to "counsel's qualifications, experience, and abilities at the time of appointment").
10. See id. at 114-16. For a discussion of the consequences of inadequate state
post-conviction representation at the federal habeas level, see Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism:A FunctionalCritique and ProposedReconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002).

11. See generally Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tex. Grim. App. 1998)
(Baird, J., dissenting) (describing the legislature's intent to limit habeas appeals).
12. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).
13. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (concluding that the writ of
habeas corpus is "the common law world's 'freedom writ,"' and "'there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired,' . . . and unsuspended, save only in the cases
specified in our Constitution") (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939))
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the scheme of post-conviction review, the writ's purpose is to attack
the legality of a petitioner's confinement.14 Guaranteed by both the
United States Constitution1 5 and the Texas Constitution,16 the writ of

habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy regarded by the Supreme
Court as "'a bulwark against convictions that violate[s] 'fundamental

fairness."" 1 7 The Court recognized that federal habeas corpus review

tests the constitutionality of state court convictions and "'serves as
a[n] ...incentive for trial and appellate courts ...

to conduct their

proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards"' to avoid unlawful detention.

8

Similarly, state court post-

conviction proceedings determine whether a petitioner received a fair
trial by reviewing the processes that led to the final conviction and

sentence.1 9 In both state and federal courts, however, the scope of

habeas corpus review is limited to jurisdictional defects and denials of
constitutional rights.20 Thus, a petitioner may receive a new trial if
post-conviction review either reveals a lack of personal jurisdiction in
the trial court or demonstrates that the petitioner's imprisonment fails
to conform with the fundamental requirements of due process of law;
he is thus "illegally restrained in his liberty or confined."'"
In general, post-conviction habeas corpus review is neither an appeal nor a direct attack.2 2 Rather, it is a "collateral"2 3 proceeding,
(citation omitted); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1963) (describing the history
and role of habeas corpus review).
14. Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

467, 474 (2000).

15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.").
16. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall
never be suspended. The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy speedy
and effectual.").
17. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 126 (1982)).
18. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see Letty S. Di
Giulio, Note, Dying for the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in State PostConviction Proceedings: State Statutes & Due Process in Capital Cases, 9 B.U. PuB.
INT. L.J. 109, 126 (1999).
19. Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 114-15 (citing numerous state cases holding that
post-conviction review ensures a defendant was not wrongly convicted).
20. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Ex parte
Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
21. Charles M. Mallin, Death Penalty: Texas Law-Subsequent Writs and Abuse of
the Writ Doctrine in Texas, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 151, 152, 171-72 (2000) (discussing the writ of habeas corpus); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 11.071
(Vernon Supp. 2003) (describing writ of habeas corpus as a "remedy to be used when
any person is restrained in his liberty").
22. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987). The court noted that
collateral review is brought after direct appeal is resolved, and it attacks convictions
that have "long since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process." Id. at
555.
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occurring either after a petitioner has failed to obtain relief through
direct appellate review of his conviction and sentence or when direct
appellate review is no longer available because the conviction has become "final. '24 After a death-row inmate is tried and sentenced in
state court, the writ of habeas corpus essentially becomes a new proceeding initiated to raise constitutional or jurisdictional challenges
that were not previously adjudicated in the original conviction.2 5 In
setting forth allegations of constitutional or jurisdictional error at trial,
sentencing, or appeal, a petitioner may raise new issues and bring evidence of any facts unknown at the time of conviction to the trial
court's attention.2 6 Thus, by allowing for review of legal errors that
might have occurred at trial, state post-conviction review can provide
a remedy, even if a conviction is affirmed on direct appeal.2 7
Accordingly, post-conviction review provides a death-row inmate
with an important forum to adjudicate claims that he could not adequately raise in the lower courts. 28 Although state habeas corpus provides "a vital link in the capital [appellate] review process, ''2 9 habeas
review is not part of the criminal proceeding itself.3" Instead, requests
for collateral review are civil in nature.3 1 Consequently, according to
the Supreme Court, a state has no obligation to provide post-conviction review, and even if it does, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that state to appoint a lawyer as
32
well.

23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 255 (7th ed. 1999) ("An attack on a judgment entered in a different proceeding. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one type of
collateral attack.").
24. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555, 557.
25. See Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that
"constitutional error may be raised for the first time in a post-conviction [habeas
writ]"); see also Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
(en banc) (noting that habeas corpus review is available for constitutional and jurisdictional defects in a judgment of conviction).
26. Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 115 (describing post-conviction review as a process
for raising issues unknown at the time of trial).
27. Clive A. Stafford Smith & R6my Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending That
Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 Loy. L. REV. 55, 57 (1999).
28. Id. at 88-100. State post-conviction review may be a petitioner's first opportunity to raise claims such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or newly discovered evidence. Id. at 57.
29. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 8 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1993).
30. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) ("Post-conviction relief is
even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.").
31. Id. at 557; see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) (noting that the writ of
habeas corpus is traditionally characterized as an "original ... civil remedy for the
enforcement of the right to personal liberty").
32. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
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Texas's Statutory Scheme for Capital Habeas Corpus Review
1. Statutory Provisions

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.071 establishes the exclusive procedure for a writ of habeas corpus application where the
applicant seeks relief from a judgment imposing the death penalty.3 3
Article 11.071 provides for a "unitary system ' 34 of capital post-conviction review, in which a petitioner's direct appeal need not be final
before his habeas application is filed.3 5 When the direct appeal and
collateral processes overlap, the unitary system provides an expedited
review process.36 Prior to the 1995 enactment of article 11.071, death
penalty cases proceeded through the appellate system with the
mandatory direct appeals occurring first.3 7 Then, habeas relief was
available in state court if a death-row inmate was unsuccessful in those
direct appeals, with final review available from the United States Supreme Court.38 Under the current article 11.071, after the conclusion
of the now concurrent habeas corpus and direct appellate reviews, the
only available remedy is petitioning the federal courts for habeas
corpus relief.39 Thus, by enacting article 11.071, the Texas Legislature
facilitated speedier executions, but the time frame during which a condemned individual can acquire new evidence of innocence is
shortened.4 o
Article 11.071 further limits the scope of habeas corpus review by
mandating that an application filed after the 180-day deadline under
section 4(a) is presumed untimely. 41 One 90-day extension is possible,
33. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2003).

34. Joan M. Fisher, Expedited Review of Capital Post-Conviction Claims: Idaho's
Flawed Process, 2 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 85, 85-86 (2000) (defining "unitary system" as one that "essentially consolidates the direct appeal and state post-conviction
process [sic] to eliminate the additional time involved in consideration of collateral
attacks").
35. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4(a) (providing that an appli-

cation for a habeas writ must be filed "not later than the 180th day after the convicting court appoints counsel .

. . ,

or not later than the 45th day after the date the state's

original brief is filed on direct appeal.. . , whichever date is later" (emphasis added));
see also Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that the
unitary system is one in which "direct appeals and habeas review proceed[] along
parallel paths at roughly the same time").
36. See Fisher, supra note 34, at 87.
37. See James C. Harrington & Anne More Burnham, Texas's New Habeas Corpus
Procedure for Death-Row Inmates: Kafkaesque-and Probably Unconstitutional, 27
ST. MARY'S L.J. 69, 73 (1995).
38. Id.; see also Fisher, supra note 34, at 89 (stating that a majority of the death
penalty states rely on a capital review process in which post-conviction review follows
both an automatic sentence review by the court of last resort in that state and direct
appellate review of error in the trial and sentencing phases).
39. Harrington, supra note 37, at 72-73.
40. Id. at 73-74.
41. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2003); see

also supra text accompanying note 35.
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however, upon the showing of "good cause."'4 2 In addition to this time
limitation, article 11.071 generally restricts a capital inmate to a single
application for state post-conviction habeas corpus review. 4 3 However, the statute provides three enumerated exceptions to this rule
whereby an applicant may be allowed to file a subsequent habeas application. 44 Specifically, the court may consider the merits of a subsequent habeas application if that application sufficiently establishes:
(1) the current claims ... could not have been presented previously
...because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable;
(2) by a preponderance of the evidence ...no rational juror could

have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or
(3) by clear and convincing evidence .. .no rational juror would

have answered in the state's favor one or more of the special
issues.4 5
Thus, although the initial writ application can raise any number of
constitutional or jurisdictional issues, consideration of a second application is barred unless an applicant establishes one of the three
conditions.4 6
These habeas corpus review limitations greatly expedited the capital
post-conviction review process. The Texas Legislature compensated
for these strict limitations on both the time and the availability of successive writs47 by including a mandatory provision instructing the convicting court to appoint counsel for indigent applicants.4 8 Article
11.071, section 2A requires the state to reimburse counties up to
$25,000 for each indigent defendant's appointed habeas counsel.4 9
42. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4(b) ("The convicting court,
before the filing date... may for good cause shown and after notice and an opportunity to be heard by the attorney representing the state grant one 90-day extension that
begins on the filing date .. .under Subsection (a)."); see, e.g., Ex parte Ramos, 977
S.W.2d 616, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (upholding the trial court's finding of "good
cause" where an applicant filed late in reliance on the trial court's incorrect calculation of a deadline).
43. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(a) (stating that unless a
subsequent application contains certain specific facts, a court may not consider the
merits of the subsequent application).
44. Id. § 5(a)(1)-(3).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 5(a); see also Mallin, supra note 21, at 167 (discussing the three conditions
in which a second habeas application will be considered).
47. See Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 219-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en bane)
(finding that Texas's expedited post-conviction review passed constitutional muster by
rejecting constitutional challenges to article 11.071 based on separation of powers,
equal protection, and due process claims).
48. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(c) ("At the earliest practical
time, but in no event later than 30 days,... the convicting court shall appoint competent counsel unless the applicant elects to proceed pro se or is represented by retained
counsel.") (emphasis added); id. § 2(d) (stating that the convicting court's appointment must be "approved by the court of criminal appeals in any manner provided by
those rules" adopted for appointment of counsel).
49. Id. § 2A(a).
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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Further, the legislature specified that "[a]n applicant shall be represented by competent counsel unless the applicant has elected to proceed pro se." 5 ° Upon appointment, habeas counsel has a mandatory
duty to "investigate expeditiously.. . the factual and legal grounds for
the filing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus."'" Finally,
instead of including competency standards in the statute itself, the legislature delegated the task of promulgating rules for the appointment
of "competent" counsel to the court of criminal appeals.5
2.

Judicial Interpretation of Article 11.071

According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the legislature
enacted article 11.071 to prevent repetitious habeas writs. 53 Thus,
under the court's interpretation, article 11.071 represents the notion
that a death-row inmate has "one full and fair opportunity to present
his constitutional or jurisdictional claims."' 54 In analyzing this "one
full and fair opportunity," the court of criminal appeals has concentrated on the effort of article 11.071 to speed up habeas corpus review,
but it has failed to provide
guidance concerning the requisites of ap55
pointed habeas counsel.
a.

Expedited Review

In interpreting article 11.071, Texas courts initially appeared to focus on the effect of the legislature's effort to expedite capital postconviction review. Soon after article 11.071 became effective, the
court of criminal appeals faced state and federal equal protection
challenges to Texas's new capital writ scheme.5 6 In response, the court
concluded in Ex parte Davis that article 11.071 merely placed restrictions on how and when a petitioner could exercise his habeas corpus
right so that frivolous attempts to invoke the remedy could be
thwarted.5 7 Noting that article 11.071 was promulgated pursuant to a
Texas constitutional mandate to the legislature to "'enact laws to
render the [writ] remedy speedy and effectual,' "58 the court held that
the statute merely provides the procedure for rendering the habeas
corpus writ, and it neither suspends the right to habeas corpus review
50. Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added).

51. Id. § 3(a).
52. Id. § 2(c) (requiring the appointment of "competent counsel"); id. § 2(d) (requiring the court of criminal appeals to adopt rules for the appointment of attorneys
as habeas counsel).
53. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
54. Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
55. See id. at 419-20.
56. E.g., Ex pane Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
57. See id. at 219 (rejecting the applicant's argument that "Article 11.071 'suspends' [habeas corpus] rights by limiting a capital applicant to a single habeas corpus
application").
58. Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12).
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nor violates equal protection or due process. 59 Thus, the statute
passed constitutional muster.6°
Similarly, in Ex parte Smith,6 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
stated that the "screamingly obvious intent of Article 11.071 is to
speed up the habeas corpus procedures for capital cases.",62 Justice
Baird, in a scathing dissent, argued that based on the literal text of
article 11.071 section 2(a), the "'screamingly obvious' intent ...was to
provide competent counsel. ' 63 Referring to the legislative debates on
the proposed article 11.071 in both the House and the Senate, Justice
Baird noted the intent of the legislature was to provide petitioners
"one full 'bite at the apple"' through which every issue that can possibly be raised will be raised on the first application.6 4 By stating that
the legislature clearly contemplated that the bite would be a full one,65
Justice Baird expressed concern that the majority ignored its own failure to fulfill the duty to appoint competent counsel.6 6
b.

Requisites of Counsel

Because judicial interpretation of article 11.071 has focused mainly
on the expedited post-conviction review, few Texas cases have interpreted the article's provision for appointing habeas counsel. In fact,
the meaning of the statutory mandate of "competent counsel" was not
addressed by the majority of the court of criminal appeals until Ex
parte Mines,6 7 five years after the enactment of article 11.071.68 In
that case, the court held that "competent" under article 11.071 refers
only to a habeas "attorney's qualifications and abilities., 69 The court
also noted that habeas counsel has a duty to "investigate expeditiously
the factual and legal grounds for an application."7 0 Mines failed to
address, however, whether article 11.071 mandates that appointed
counsel be competent, and what "qualifications and abilities" lead to a
finding that appointed habeas counsel is "competent."' 7 1 Recently, the
court reaffirmed its holding in Mines, stating that "competency" con59. Id.
60. See id. at 221.
61. 977 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
62. Id. at 611.
63. Id. at 614 (Baird, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 612-13 (Baird, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Baird, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 614 (Baird, J., dissenting). Judge Baird argued that Smith was denied his
"'one bite at the apple"' not through his own fault, but because the court appointed
less than competent counsel. Id. Judge Baird found that Smith's counsel was "less
than competent" because he filed Smith's application for habeas corpus relief 129
days late. See id.
67. 26 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc).
68. Id. at 910, 912 (holding that a capital defendant need not be competent to
assist his attorney in filing an application for a habeas corpus writ).
69. Id. at 912.
70. Id.
71. See id.
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cerns habeas counsel's experience, ability, and qualifications at the
time of appointment.7 2
In Ex parte Graves, the court of criminal appeals finally extinguished habeas applicants' false hopes that effective representation is

constitutionally guaranteed on post-conviction habeas corpus re-

view. 73 The court concluded that although article 11.071 mandates a
statutory right to appointed competent counsel, it grants neither a

statutory nor a constitutional right to the effective assistance of that

counsel. 4 Instead, the Graves court reasoned that while the writ is a

constitutional remedy for illegal confinement, Texas is not required by
either the federal or Texas constitutions to appoint and compensate
counsel to pursue habeas relief.75 Finally, the court expanded the
Mines analysis of competency and held that article 11.071 concerns
only the initial appointment of habeas counsel and not the final prod-

uct of representation or the services rendered by "competent" counsel. 76 Nevertheless, the court's expanded analysis failed in one crucial
aspect: it did not include the specific types of qualifications, amount of
experience, and types of abilities required from a "competent" habeas
attorney.7 7
The Graves court faced a prime opportunity to fulfill the statutory

mandate of article 11.071(d) and adopt binding rules for the appointment of habeas attorneys. Unfortunately, the court again neglected
its duty to provide a workable definition of "competent" counsel and
the standards necessary to appoint the same.78 Texas case law reveals
that the court of criminal appeals has completely failed to adopt any
articulable competency standards. 79 For example, under the 1995 ver-

sion of article 11.071,80 the court's system for evaluating the qualifications of counsel consisted only of reviewing questionnairescompleted
72. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
73. See id. at 113 (holding that there is "no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel" on habeas corpus writ in Texas).
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id. at 111.
76. See id. at 114.
77. See id. at 114, 117 (stating that "competent counsel" refers to "counsel's qualifications, experience, and abilities at the time of appointment").
78. See id. at 114 & n.45.
79. See, e.g., Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Texas's mechanism for providing competent post-conviction counsel did not meet the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provisions for expedited
federal habeas corpus review because it did not provide explicit competency standards), vacated in part by 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Graves, 70 S.W.3d at
114 (limiting the definition of "competent" to qualifications, abilities, and experience
at the time of appointment).
80. Habeas Corpus Reform Act, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, § 1, sec. 2(d), 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2764, 2764 (amended 1997, 1999) (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (Vernon Supp. 2003)) (stating that the court of criminal appeals shall appoint competent post-conviction habeas counsel under rules adopted by
that court).
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and submitted by prospective counsel.8 1 This informal process assigned individual judges of the court of criminal appeals to a particular

geographic region of the state to review applicants from that area.82
Although it was intended to ensure competence, in reality, the process
did not fulfill the statutory mandate to adopt rules and standards governing qualifications of counsel.8 3 Instead, the court's system resulted
in a list of attorneys who were eligible for appointment based mainly
on whether the court "fe[lt] comfortable with" the attorneys. 84 The
legislature attempted to remedy this inadequate informal process in

1999 by amending article 11.071 to transfer appointing authority to the
convicting court. However, Texas still has no articulable standards
for determining whether it is providing adequate, appointed counsel
on state post-conviction review. 86
C.

Current Crisis in Capital Post-Conviction Representation

Legal minds regard capital post-conviction habeas procedure as peculiarly complex, specialized, and time-consuming work. 87 Habeas
representation demands a diverse range of experience by requiring an
attorney to bridge the "'horizontal divide between trial and appellate
experience [as well as] the vertical divide between federal and state
law and courts[, but] [f]ew lawyers are equally at home on all sides of
these divides.' "88 One commentator queried "whether 'competent
81. See Mata, 99 F.3d at 1267 (describing the "flexible" Texas appointment system
as unsatisfactory due to a lack of binding standards and a failure to mandate postconviction experience).
82. Mark Ballard, New Habeas Scheme Off to Slow Start, TEX. LAW, Jan. 8, 1996,
at 1, 20 (reporting that attorneys were asked to fill out applications asking "for five
references and a list of criminal cases handled").
83. See id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Presiding Judge, Michael McCormick, noted that eligibility for appointment in capital habeas cases does not require any appellate experience or "special training." Id.
84. Id.
85. See Act of May 20, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 803, § i,sec. 2(d), 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3431, 3431 (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071
(Vernon Supp. 2003)); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 115 & n.51 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (stating that the legislature based the change on the proposition that the convicting court has more knowledge of the competence of potential habeas counsel than
the court of criminal appeals and can better determine both the willingness and availability of habeas counsel to serve); id. at 121-22 (Price, J., dissenting) (noting that the
legislature "sought to improve the quality of representation" by requiring "that appointment of counsel be made by the convicting court instead of [the court of criminal
appeals]").
86. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 122 (Price, J., dissenting). The convicting courts appoint habeas counsel based on the "rules" adopted by the court of criminal appeals,
but those rules only consist of a "list of attorneys eligible for appointment." Thus, the
convicting courts' basis for the appointment decisions is a list of attorneys originally
created and maintained by the court of criminal appeals. Id. (Price, J., dissenting).
87. Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 119.
88. Id. (quoting Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Representing the Death Row Inmate: The
Ethics of Advocacy, Collateral Style, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY 92, 98-99
(Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989)).
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representation' is even possible" in post-conviction representation.8 9
For example, an attorney preparing a petition for post-conviction
habeas corpus review must not only have knowledge of constitutional
law, but that attorney must also understand the facts of the case and
perform a thorough investigation based on an understanding of the
legal significance of those facts. 9° Unfortunately, many lawyers appointed to represent petitioners on post-conviction review lack even a
basic understanding of habeas corpus law. 91
In addition to ignorance of habeas procedure, the lack of guiding
qualification standards leads to the appointment of post-conviction
counsel who are grossly deficient. Despite the statutory provision requiring appointment of "competent" habeas counsel, many lawyers
initially appointed by the court of criminal appeals to represent capital
habeas applicants lacked any death penalty or habeas corpus experience. 92 Soon after the 1995 enactment of article 11.071, troubling instances emerged where post-conviction counsel gave deficient
representation. For example, in one case, appointed habeas counsel
spent fewer than fifty hours on the case, performed no investigation,
filed a seventeen-line writ citing only three cases, and provided no
citations to the trial record. 93 In another case, appointed habeas counsel filed an application that cited no cases and presented no analysis of
the law. 94 One habeas attorney, after filing a writ that failed to raise
any issues attacking the validity of his client's conviction or sentence,
later admitted under oath that he was not competent to represent that
89. Id. at 119 n.80.
90. Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 71 (1990).
91. See id. at 71 n.179. "'Habeas corpus is as unfamiliar to a lot of lawyers as
atomic physics."' Id. (quoting John C. Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death
Sentenced Inmates, 42 REc. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 859, 863 (1987)).
92. See Christy Hoppe, Death Row Inmates Get Lawyers Before Deadline, but Attorneys Lack Expertise, Some Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 1997, at 17A
(reporting that most appointed habeas attorneys had never handled a post-conviction
case and noting a comment by one habeas attorney that eighty percent of the appointed lawyers were "in over their heads"); see also Janet Elliott, Beazley Lawyer
Admits Botching Initial Appeal, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 15, 2001, at 21A (stating that
"[Napoleon] Beazley's case was one of the first handled under [the] 1995 habeas reform law" and reporting that Beazley's appointed habeas attorney had never handled
a death-row appeal and admitted to inadequately investigating and briefing the case).
93. Ex parte Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 589, 589 & n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird,
J., dissenting) (referring to deficient representation by the habeas counsel appointed
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and stating his opposition to the en banc
decision that the case should not be remanded to the habeas court for a determination
of whether Martinez received effective assistance of counsel), affd, 255 F.3d 229 (5th
Cir. 2001); see also Ballard, supra note 82, at 20 (reporting that an "average petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in a capital case requires about 400 hours of work").
94. Ex parteWolfe, 977 S.W.2d 603, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should remand to habeas court to determine whether
applicant received effective assistance of counsel on habeas application).
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client under article 11.071. 95 In that instance, the attorney had been

licensed for a mere two years and had no experience in either trying
or appealing capital cases.96
In each of the cases illustrated above, the court of criminal appeals

dismissed the writ and refused either to remand to the habeas court
for a determination of whether habeas counsel provided "effective"

representation or to stay the applicant's scheduled execution.97 The
lack of standards governing court-appointed capital post-conviction
counsel often leads to the appointment of unqualified counsel.98 As a

result, many Texas death-row inmates fail to receive statutorily mandated post-conviction review of their convictions and sentences because they did not have qualified court-appointed counsel. 9 9 Thus,
when a writ of habeas corpus is denied because of an appointed post-

conviction counsel's deficient performance, what is the condemned inmate's remedy?
III.

WHAT

IS

"COMPETENT" COUNSEL? AN ANALYSIS OF A

PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR RELIEF

A.

Right to "Effective" Assistance of Counsel on
Post-Conviction Review

The remedy analysis begins with a determination of whether capital
habeas petitioners have a Sixth Amendment constitutional right to
counsel and the concomitant right to the effective assistance of that
counsel. 10 0 In seeking the full range of rights to counsel under the
95. See Ex parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J.,
dissenting). Judge Overstreet noted that counsel admitted he erroneously believed
Kerr's conviction was not final when the application was due, and therefore no issues
could be raised attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Id. Judge Overstreet then argued that Kerr's execution should be stayed because Kerr had not been
"afforded his legal right to apply for habeas corpus relief." Id. (Overstreet, J.,
dissenting).
96. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783,
804. But see Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (finding counsel competent and qualified to handle Kerr's case at the time of appointment, despite
counsel's blatant error in filing Kerr's initial habeas writ).
97. See supra notes 93-95.
98. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(addressing a crisis in state post-conviction representation where legal counsel available to capital defendants is "woefully inadequate" and describing the state of postconviction representation in Texas in 1993 as "desperate"), denying cert. to 8 F.3d 256
(5th Cir. 1993).
99. See, e.g., Kerr, 977 S.W.2d at 585 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
court's refusal to stay Kerr's execution was a "farce and travesty" of his legal right to
habeas relief and stating that the court would have "blood on its hands" for allowing
the execution to go forward).
100. See generally McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970) ("It has
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel.").
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Sixth Amendment, numerous death-row habeas applicants file subsequent writs, claiming that the failure of their article 11.071 habeas attorney to assert valid claims in the initial writ application deprived
them of effective assistance of counsel.1" 1 Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to capital post-conviction review,102 Texas death-row habeas petitioners conclude that the right is
mandated by Texas's statutory grant of "competent" counsel. 0 3 Essentially, the argument attempts to bootstrap the constitutional guarantee of effectiveness to the provision of article 11.071, requiring the
appointment of "competent" counsel on post-conviction review. 0 4
1. No Constitutional Right to Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,0 5 the right
to counsel is guaranteed only at the trial stage "[iln all criminal prosecutions."1 06 Because the Sixth Amendment only identifies the rights
available to a criminal defendant in preparing for trial and at the trial
itself, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that it includes any right
to appeal. 10 7 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to indigent prisoners who apply for state post-conviction collateral relief.'
Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to require states to appoint
counsel when prisoners mount collateral attacks on their convictions. 10 9 As a matter of legislative policy, states may choose to provide counsel at all stages of judicial review, but the Supreme Court
101. See, e.g., Ex Parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (representing applicant's third post-conviction writ); Kerr, 64 S.W.3d at 415 (claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus).
102. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991); see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (refusing to establish a constitutional right to counsel on
habeas corpus review).
103. E.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113 (arguing that counsel's performance must be
"constitutionally effective" because article 11.071 creates a statutory right to "competent" counsel on habeas review).
104. Id.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
106. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963); see also Ross v. Moffit, 417
U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (refusing to find that the Due Process Clause requires states to
provide counsel on discretionary appeals to state supreme courts); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963) (requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defendants on "first appeal ... as . . .of right" based on the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses).
107. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 159-60 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings and that the
right to appeal is a creature created by statute).
108. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (holding that states have no obligation to provide post-conviction review and rejecting suggestion that right to counsel
be established on discretionary appeals).
109. Id.
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makes it clear that neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require it." °
Although the Court's refusals to recognize a right to counsel on discretionary post-conviction appeals initially applied only to non-capital, post-conviction proceedings, 1 ' the Supreme Court extended its
line of reasoning to capital, post-conviction review in Murray v. Giarratano."' Thus, even an indigent inmate who is facing the death penalty has no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel on state
habeas corpus review. 11 3 According to the Supreme Court's reasoning, there can be no deprivation of the effective assistance of habeas
counsel because no constitutional right to counsel exists on capital
post-conviction review." 4 Therefore, a death-row inmate cannot
claim that his habeas counsel gave constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel on his initial writ application." 5 Instead, an applicant
must rely on the statutory guarantee of counsel under article 11.071,
section 2(a) when claiming 16
the right to effective assistance of counsel
on post-conviction review.'
2.

The Claimed Right Under Article 11.071

Acting within its discretion to develop procedures to assist prisoners
in seeking post-conviction review," 7 the Texas Legislature affords a8
writ of habeas corpus to a death-row inmate as a matter of right."1
The contested issue is whether that statutory right necessarily includes
110. Id. at 555-56; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that states have "considerable discretion
in assuring that those imprisoned in their jails obtain meaningful access to the judicial
process").
111. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57.
112. 492 U.S. at 7, 12 (finding no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings challenging a death sentence).
113. See id. at 19-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that "[t]he
unique nature of the death penalty not only necessitates additional protections during
pretrial, guilt, and sentencing phases, but also enhances the importance of the appellate process." Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam).
115. Id.; Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 112-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing to
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of an applicant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in the initial habeas proceeding).
116. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (stating
that a habeas applicant "shall be represented by competent counsel" (emphasis
added)).
117. See generally Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (stating that the
state legislatures have the power to implement procedures for post-conviction
review).
118. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(b) ("If a defendant is sentenced to death the convicting court ... shall determine if [he] is indigent and, if so,
whether [he] desires appointment of counsel for the purpose of a writ of habeas
corpus.").
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the requirement of effective assistance of counsel.1 1 9 Based on the

language of article 11.071 section 2(a), it is argued that the legislature
intended to place an effective assistance of counsel requirement on

the writ process.12 ° Specifically, by both statutorily providing for the
appointment of "competent" counsel and directing counsel to investigate all factual and legal claims, petitioners argue that the Texas Legislature mandates that they are entitled to effective assistance of
counsel on the same level as that afforded a criminal defendant at
trial. 12 ' Thus, petitioners conclude that the statutory right to appointment of counsel includes the right to "effective" representation. 12 2
Texas death-row habeas petitioners also rely on the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to claim that effective assistance of counsel is mandated where counsel is ensured as a matter of
right. 123 By creating a writ mechanism under article 11.071, petitioners argue that Texas must afford due process of law to those who take
advantage of it. 124 Relying on the language of the Supreme Court,

petitioners claim that when a state decides to act in an area where its
action has significant discretionary elements, "it must... act in accord
with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord
with the Due Process Clause.' 1 25 Thus, by requiring appointment of

counsel for death-row inmates pursuing writs of habeas corpus, Texas

acted in an area requiring constitutional compliance. 126
Essentially, due process requires the procedural scheme utilized by
the state during habeas corpus review to comport with "fairness. "127
119. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970) (recognizing that
the "right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of that counsel"); e.g., Graves,
70 S.W.3d at 126 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting the Supreme Court of Iowa, which
argued that the statutory grant of post-conviction right to counsel implies that the
counsel be effective).
120. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 127 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that the statutory
requirement of section 2(a) of "competent" counsel mandates constitutionally effective assistance of habeas counsel).
121. See, e.g., id. at 114, 116 (restating Graves's losing argument that a "competent"
counsel's performance must be constitutionally effective in habeas proceeding); Ex
parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (rejecting Davis's
argument that because article 11.071 provided for the appointment of "'competent'
counsel, [habeas] counsel must be ...constitutionally 'effective"').
122. E.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113.
123. E.g., In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273, 274-76 (stating that Goff claimed a violation of
the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment after he was appointed
"incompetent state habeas counsel"); see Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 111-12. The court
rejected applicant's claim that ineffective assistance of first habeas counsel deprived
him of due process. Id. at 113.
124. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 116.
125. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 405 (finding that due process fairness concerns arise when a state
provides an appellate system as of right but refuses to offer each defendant a fair
opportunity to adjudicate on the merits of his appeal); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
609 (1974) ("'[D]ue process' emphasizes fairness between the state and individual
....1,).
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In keeping with this notion of fairness, petitioners argue that the Due
Process Clause requires Texas to simultaneously confer a right to effective assistance of counsel whenever the state chooses to provide, in
a statute, capital defendants with a right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings.9 128 Otherwise, the appointment of counsel is an empty
12

formality.

Because petitioners argue that the right to appointed counsel in the
statutory guarantee of article 11.071 necessarily entails the right to
constitutionally "effective" representation, 130 the next determination
concerns the standard of review applicable when subsequent writs
claim ineffective assistance of counsel appointed under article 11.071.
Specifically, petitioners often argue that the statutory right to habeas
counsel in Texas includes the constitutional standard
of effective assis3
tance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.1 1
B.

Application of ConstitutionalStandard of Review

Based on the presumption that a state-created right to habeas counsel under article 11.071 necessarily includes a guarantee of effective
assistance of that counsel, petitioners claim the right to invoke the
constitutional standard of Strickland v. Washington to review alleged
ineffectiveness based on counsel's deficient performance on an initial
application. 32 Because no standard of review is enunciated by article
11.071, petitioners argue that adoption of the constitutional
standard
1 33
of effective assistance of counsel is appropriate.
Under Strickland v. Washington, the proper standard for attorney
performance is "reasonably effective assistance."' 3 4 In presenting a
valid claim of "actual ineffectiveness" of retained or appointed counsel, a defendant must not only show deficient performance by counsel,
128. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 116 (discussing the due process fairness concept as it
relates to the Equal Protection Clause); see also Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 109 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize the right to effective assistance of counsel when it grants a statutory right to counsel).
129. See, e.g., Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397 ("[A] right to counsel on appeal.., would be a
futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.");
Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 126 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the provision of
counsel without any requirement of effectiveness is an empty gesture).
130. See, e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 114; Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 911-13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (holding that a petitioner does not have a right to
claim constitutionally ineffective representation in state habeas proceedings).
131. See, e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 104-05, 113 (arguing that Graves was entitled to
have the merits of his constitutional ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel
claim heard on a subsequent writ); see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984) (stating that counsel's "reasonably effective assistance" is measured by objective standards of reasonableness under "prevailing professional
norms").
132. See, e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113; Mines, 26 S.W.3d at 912-13.
133. See, e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 112, 114 & n.45; see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 11 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
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but a defendant must also suffer sufficient prejudice because of counsel's deficient performance. 1 35 The Court adopted the following twopart test to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1)
whether "counsel's performance was deficient," measured by "an objective standard of reasonableness" under "prevailing professional
norms," and if deficient representation is found, (2) whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant's trial, measured by a reasonable
probability that the result would
have been different had counsel's
136
performance been effective.

Thus, to show ineffective assistance of habeas counsel under the
Strickland standard, first a petitioner would be required to establish,
for example, that habeas counsel failed to consult with him or her on
important decisions, failed to keep him or her informed, or failed to
use such "skill and knowledge" as would render the post-conviction
process a reliable avenue of review.137 Upon this initial showing, the
petitioner then would be required to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for habeas counsel's deficient representation, his
or her initial habeas application would have contained sufficient allegations demonstrating his or her illegal confinement, the writ would
have been granted, and he or she would have received a new trial.1 3 8
In reviewing habeas counsel's performance under Strickland, "judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and the
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. 139
Arguably, numerous Texas death-row petitioners could demonstrate instances of "actual ineffectiveness" of habeas counsel. 140 To
date, however, the court of criminal appeals has refused to remand
any matter to the habeas court for a determination of whether a petitioner received effective assistance of habeas counsel under Strickland.141 The court finally resolved the issue in Ex parte Graves by
135. See id. at 693.
136. See id. at 687-88, 694; Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (en banc) (stating that ineffective performance is that which deviates from prevailing professional norms, and that deficiency must prejudice trial); Hernandez v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the right to
counsel is not the right to error-free counsel).
137. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
138. See id. at 694 ("The [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."); see also Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 128 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that a petitioner could prevail under the Strickland test by "demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, had habeas counsel performed
effectively, the applicant would have been entitled to relief in the earlier habeas
proceeding").
139. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
140. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Ex parte Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(Baird, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case should be remanded to the habeas court
for a determination of whether Martinez received effective assistance of counsel),
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holding that absent a constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings, Texas petitioners have no right to constitutionally effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel. 142 Thus, the court of criminal
appeals specifically refused to apply the Strickland standard of effectiveness to habeas counsel in Texas. 143 An analysis of the following
purposes of article 11.071 illustrates that the Graves court reached the
correct conclusion.
IV.

WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM FAILS WHEN APPLIED TO
CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

A.

"Competent" Counsel Is No ConstitutionalMandate

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that allowing
the petitioners to invoke a claim of effective assistance of appointed
habeas counsel is a statutory right and not a constitutional mandate,
and thus impliedly refused to apply the Strickland standard.1 44 First,
the legislature's provision mandating appointment of "competent"
counsel on post-conviction habeas corpus review does not imply a
constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.1 4 5 Second, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state
post-conviction proceedings, habeas counsel cannot be constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington. 1 6 Thus, a petitioner has no constitutional right to challenge
affd, 255 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001); Ex parte Wolfe, 977 S.W.2d 603, 603 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (Baird, J., dissenting) (arguing that the matter should be remanded to the
habeas court to determine whether applicant received effective assistance of counsel
on habeas application).
142. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113 (concluding that article 11.071 did not create a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and specifically declining to "turn a
legislative act of grace into a constitutional right").
143. See id.
144. See id. at 113, 117. Judge Johnson, in the dissent, suggests that the Strickland
test is the appropriate standard when determining effective assistance of appointed
habeas counsel; the Strickland standard for attorney performance is that the assistance must be reasonably effective. Id. at 127 & n.3 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 117; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991);
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings); Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987) (noting that the Pennsylvania Constitution, not the
United States Constitution, has granted access to counsel in a post-conviction
proceeding).
146. See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 271 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
despite petitioner's argument that meaningful post-conviction review was rendered
impossible due to habeas counsel's heavy caseload, no constitutional right to habeas
counsel exists in state collateral proceedings, and Beazley could not claim a constitutional violation); see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)
(stating that the constitutional "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel is measured by objective standards of reasonableness under "prevailing professional
norms").
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the effectiveness of habeas counsel on post-conviction
* 147
review.
Despite petitioners' arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court
also rejected the notion "that when a State chooses to offer help to
those seeking relief from convictions, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must assume.' 14 8 Instead, in its
discretion, a state may choose to provide "assistance of counsel without requiring the full panoply of procedural protections that the Constitution requires be given to defendants who are in a fundamentally
different position-at trial and on first appeal as of right.' 49 Texas
made a valid decision to grant habeas petitioners assistance of counsel, but that act of legislative grace does not trigger a constitutional
right to effective representation in habeas proceedings. 5 °
Further, the court of criminal appeals specifically rejected the argument that the Texas Constitution grants more rights on habeas corpus
review than does the federal Constitution. 1 51 As such, there is no
right to post-conviction habeas counsel under Article I, Section 10 of
the Texas Constitution. 5 ' On the other hand, even if the Graves court
had determined that the constitutional standard of effective assistance
applied to a statutory grant of "competent" counsel, such relief would
be inconsistent with the article 11.071 goals of providing both finality
and one full review of a death-row inmate's conviction and
sentence. 53
B.

Successive Writs Claiming Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Undermine Purposes of Article 11.071
1. Doctrine of Finality

Successive habeas writs undermine the principle of finality of criminal judgments. The Supreme Court observed that, despite its importance in the scheme of capital post-conviction review, "'the Great
Writ entails significant costs.' ,154 The most significant of those costs
147. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 396-97 & n.7 (1985) (stating that a
defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel only on first appeal of right).
148. Finley, 481 U.S. at 559.
149. Id.
150. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 112-13.
151. Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (holding
that the Texas Constitution provides no right to counsel in post-conviction habeas
corpus proceedings).
152. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused . . . shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel").
153. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 114, 116 (stating that the legislature enacted article
11.071 to prevent repetitious writs); Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (concluding that the legislature intended article 11.071 to allow death-row
inmates "one full and fair opportunity to present ... constitutional or jurisdictional
claims in accordance with the procedures of the statute").
154. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982)).
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is the loss of finality in criminal litigation by both state and federal

collateral review of state convictions.' 55 If the Texas Court of Crimi-

nal Appeals recognized ineffective assistance of counsel claims on
post-conviction review, then such claims would go on ad infinitum.5 6
Thus, the doctrine of finality would be eroded by allowing continued

litigation concerning habeas counsel's
performance on the first habeas
157
writ and any subsequent writs.

When considering the proper scope of habeas corpus review, it must
be emphasized that the writ's primary purpose is to determine the
"'legality of the restraint under which a person is held."1

58

The Su-

preme Court determined that the writ's scope cannot be defined simply by referring to a "'perceived need"' to ensure a criminal
defendant receives "'a trial free of constitutional error.' ,,15 Instead,

interests of finality must be considered in defining the scope of habeas
review. 160 These interests prevent broadening post-conviction habeas
review under article 11.071 to include a Strickland standard of effectiveness. First, post-conviction collateral review "extends the ordeal
of trial for both society and the accused,' ' 1 61 both of whom have an

interest in the certainty that comes with an end to criminal litigation.

62

Second, allegations of deficient performance by counsel in

state habeas proceedings are even further removed from the merits of
the trial than the collateral review itself. 1 63 Litigation concerning the

performance of habeas counsel reduces not only the finality of the
trial conviction
but also
1 64
proceedings.

the finality of the direct

appellate

155. Id. at 748.
156. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 115 ("A claim of ineffective assistance of the prior
habeas counsel would simply be the gateway though which endless and repetitious
writs would resurrect."); see also Robbins, supra note 90, at 25 n.32 (stating that recognition of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would lead to an endless stream of
claims).
157. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117.
158. Kerr, 64 S.W.3d at 419 (quoting 39 Am. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (1999)).
159. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion) (arguing that due
to principles of finality, application of constitutional rules not in effect at the time a
conviction became final are restricted on habeas corpus review) (quoting Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
160. Id.
161. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-27 (1982).
162. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (citing Engle, 456 U.S. at 126
(citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963))).
163. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (stating that post-conviction
relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than discretionary, direct
review).
164. See Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ("[Hjabeas
corpus should generally not be used to re-litigate matters ... addressed on appeal
..

."

.
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Texas has a strong interest in the finality of its judgements for another reason.1 65 Without principles of finality, capital punishment is
deprived of one of its main goals-deterrence.1 6 6 By delaying the finality of criminal convictions, post-conviction habeas review under1 67
mines the deterrent function of the criminal justice system.
According to the Supreme Court, the fact that a person's life is at
stake in capital criminal prosecutions means "'only that 'conventional
notions of finality' should not have as much place in criminal as in civil
litigation, [and] not that they should have none."168 Finality becomes
a highly emotional issue when the focus concerns the deterrent effect
provided by the swift carrying out of capital punishment, especially in
the context of death penalty litigation. 16 9 Because deterrence depends
on the expectation that one who violates the law will both "'swiftly
and certainly become subject to ... just punishment,"170 the fear is
that lengthening the capital appeals process lessens the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 17 1 Proponents of the death penalty claim
that because of the delay associated with habeas
appeals, the process
1 72
already makes a mockery of the death penalty.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Graves that allowing habeas petitioners to claim a right to "effective" habeas counsel on a subsequent writ application would cause "the entire concept
173
of the finality of a criminal conviction [to] fall by the wayside.
Texas enacted article 11.071 as a measure to streamline and shorten
the state's post-conviction process, while still providing full and meaningful review of habeas applications.1 74 Thus, the legislature made a
decision to deny certain rights in order to facilitate capital punishment, provide finality in death convictions, and thereby serve the de165. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 108, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting
the convicting courts' emphasis on both deterrence and maintenance of a viable judicial system); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (White,
J., dissenting) ("[A] state has a strong interest in punishing the guilty.").
166. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion).
167. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 108 n.17.
168. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 150 (1970)).
169. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 & n.32 (1982) (noting that habeas writs
"frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders").
170. Id. at 127 n.32 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963)).
171. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117 ("There must come a time when ... the deterrent
effects of certainty and immediacy of punishment outweigh the prisoner's right to
endlessly litigate new claims.").
172. Susan L. Karamanian, Victim's Rights and the Death-Sentenced Inmate: Some
Observations and Thoughts, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1025, 1031 (1998) (noting that the
delay associated with habeas appeals offends the two goals of capital punishment:
deterrence and swift retribution).
173. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117.
174. Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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terrent effect intended by capital punishment.1 75 Given the scope and
purpose of article 11.071, the court of criminal appeals correctly refused to circumvent the legislature's policy decision by permitting capital habeas petitioners to litigate alleged deficiencies of counsel in a
previous state habeas proceeding.
2.

Abuse-of-Writ Doctrine

There is also a danger that successive habeas applications claiming
ineffective assistance of habeas counsel will lead to the writ's abuse.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first articulated the "abuse-ofwrit" doctrine in Ex parte Carr,176 stating that a habeas petitioner may
177
not be permitted to burden the courts with his habeas litigation.
Instead, if a petitioner's grounds would justify the court granting the
relief he seeks, he should present those grounds "with dispatch for
determination, rather than doling them out one-by-one .... 178 Because the "Great Writ" is too important a matter to be lightly used,
petitions must be filed in earnest, and all meritorious contentions
1 79
should be presented and ruled upon as quickly as possible.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.071 section 5(a) follows the spirit of the court's reasoning in Ex parte Carrby significantly
narrowing an applicant's right to habeas corpus relief, while still allowing all available claims to be raised at one time. 8 ' Enacted in part
to eliminate and prevent prisoner abuse of the capital habeas corpus
process, article 11.071 section 5(a) represents "a legislative codifica181 Specifition of [the] judicially created 'abuse of the writ doctrine.' ,,
cally, section 5(a) pertains to subsequent writs by limiting a death-row
inmate to a single habeas corpus application and by "generally
bar[ring] the Court of Criminal Appeals1 82from considering a second
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
However, Texas's statutory "abuse-of-writ" provision allows three
methods by which a petitioner filing a subsequent application can seek
175. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113, 117 (noting the legislature's discretion to give
habeas petitioners assistance of counsel without requiring procedural protections required by the United States Constitution).
176. 511 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
177. Id. at 525-26 (involving habeas corpus proceeding where habeas petitioner
refused to disclose several of his grounds for relief; court held that grounds were
waived by petitioner's abuse of the writ).
178. Id. at 525.
179. Id.
180. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (stating
that if a petitioner files a subsequent application for a habeas writ after filing his
initial application, the court cannot consider the subsequent application's merits unless three specific conditions are met); see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
181. Ex parte McGinn, 54 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (McCormick, P.J., concurring) (quoting Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 226 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (McCormick, P.J., concurring)).
182. Mallin, supra note 21, at 167.
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the court's review of its merits.183 Under article 11.071 section 5(a),
the court may consider the merits of a subsequent application if the
capital petitioner establishes: "(1) that the claim he raises" in the second application could not have been presented previously because it
"was factually or legally 'unavailable"' when the first petition was
filed; "(2) but for a federal constitutional violation, no rational juror
could have found [the applicant] guilty" (the "actually innocent" standard); "or (3) but for a constitutional violation, no rational juror could
have" sentenced the applicant to death.18 4
In urging the court of criminal appeals to consider the merits of a
subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus, some death-row inmates, who allege that they received ineffective assistance of habeas
counsel on their initial application attempt to invoke the first exception under section 5(a)(1).18 5 Under that exception, the ineffective
assistance claim raised in the subsequent writ must have been either
factually or legally "unavailable" to the petitioner when the initial application was filed. i s6 Based on a superficial examination of article
11.071 section 5(a)(1), it might appear that an ineffective assistance of
initial habeas counsel claim might succeed in invoking that statutory
exception to the prohibition against subsequent writs.18 7 However, a
closer reading of the statute shows that such claims attacking habeas
counsel's performance must fail. 8 8
To correctly interpret Texas's statutory abuse of the writ doctrine,
article 11.071 "section 5(a) must be read in conjunction with subsections (d) and (e)." 189 Under subsection (d), the "legal basis of a claim
is unavailable [if, before an applicant's first writ was filed, that] legal
basis was not recognized by or could not have been reasonably formulated from a final decision of the United States Supreme Court, a
court of appeals of the United States, or a [Texas] court of appellate
jurisdiction."19 Essentially, section 5(d) represents the codification of
the "novelty" doctrine, under which a claim's omission may be ex183. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(a)(l)-(3).
184. Mallin, supra note 21, at 167 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
11.071, § 5(a)(1)-(3)).
185. See, e.g., Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 115 n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(noting that Graves's assertion that his claim was "unavailable" when his initial application was filed because his first habeas counsel would not have raised the issue concerning his own representation, and therefore, Graves could not have brought his
present claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel on his first writ).
186. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(a)(1).
187. See id.
188. See id.; e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 113, 115 n.48 (refusing to read section 5(a) as
referring to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise factual or
legal claims in an earlier habeas writ and concluding that article 11.071 did not create
a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel).
189. Mallin, supra note 21, at 167.
190. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(d) (emphasis added).
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cused for cause only if the claim was "so novel that its legal basis is not
reasonably available to counsel .

"..."191

Section 5(e), on the other hand, concerns the factual unavailability

of a claim.' 9 2 That section clarifies that a claim's factual basis "is unavailable ... if [it] was not ascertainable through the exercise of rea-

sonable diligence on or before [the date of the first habeas
application].

193

When interpreting this exception to the abuse of the

writ doctrine, it must first be recalled that article 11.071 section 5(e)
concerns collateral relief, not a trial or direct appeal.

94

Second,

habeas corpus in Texas reviews only jurisdictional defects and denial
of constitutional rights. 9 5 Thus, one commentator noted that the interests of finality require a higher burden on subsequent habeas writs
than simply proving that the "claim was unavailable and ... not 'ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence'" when the
initial writ was filed.' 96 Instead, to be cognizable under subsection (e),

a "'factual unavailability' claim must be [based] on newly discovered
evidence" and must be of such a type as would demonstrate applicant's actual innocence. 9 7

An analysis of article 11.071 section 5(a)(1) illustrates that petitioners who file subsequent writs claiming ineffective assistance of initial
habeas counsel cannot establish that the subsequent claims were technically "unavailable" as required by article 11.071 section 5(a). 198

First, although petitioners may contend that certain claims should
have been raised in the initial writ, those claims were not factually or
legally unavailable when the first application was filed. 199 Rather, petitioners' focus is on habeas counsels' deficient performance in failing

191. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); see also Mallin, supra note 21, at 168.
192. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(e).
193. Id.
194. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 115 & n.48, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(emphasizing the tension in habeas corpus jurisprudence between ensuring fundamental fairness to criminal defendants, providing finality, and enhancing deterrence);
Mallin, supra note 21, at 171. "In a collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth,
accuracy, and fairness of the [petitioner's] conviction and sentence." Id. at 172.
195. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 109 (stating that a post-conviction writ must allege and
prove the violation of a specific constitutional provision by a preponderance of the
evidence); Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
196. Mallin, supra note 21, at 171-72.
197. Id. at 172.
198. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 115 n.48 (refusing to read section 5(a) as referring to a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise factual or legal claims in an
earlier habeas writ and concluding that "unavailability" refers to claims that were
unavailable at the time of the original filing); see also Ex parte McGinn, 54 S.W.3d
324, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (McCormick, P.J., concurring) (concluding
that the subsequent application did not satisfy the section 5(a) exception because it
contained no facts establishing that the claim could not have been presented in initial
application).
199. See McGinn, 54 S.W.3d at 331 (Womack, J., concurring) (stating that a court
may not consider the merits of a subsequent habeas application unless the issues were
legally or factually unavailable at the time the initial application was filed).
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to raise those contentions.2 °° Second, although habeas counsels' deficient performance was technically unavailable as a claim on the initial
writ, that "unavailability" was neither because the legal basis of ineffective assistance was not "recognized by ... a final decision of the
United States Supreme Court" when the applicant filed his initial
writ, 20 1 nor because it was a "factual basis . . . not ascertainable
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. ' 20 2 In fact, the contention of ineffective assistance could not be raised until after initial
habeas counsel filed the original writ because such a claim essentially
admits that the factual foundations and legal bases were present, but
counsel failed to include them in the initial application. Thus, the contention that habeas counsel was deficient on a previous application
does not fit within the exception articulated by section 5(a).2 °3
Therefore, engrafting a constitutional standard of effective assistance of counsel to post-conviction review would undermine the doctrine of finality. Such a standard would also lead to abuse of the writ
by allowing habeas petitioners to bring otherwise barred claims simply
by alleging that the writ attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel.20 4 However, without "competent" assistance of counsel,
many petitioners lose their opportunity to present meaningful claims
when challenging their convictions and death sentences on state
habeas corpus review.20 5 The solution lies in ensuring that competent
counsel is provided in the first place, as qualified counsel will uncover
more claims and present them20 6more effectively, thereby reducing the
need for successive petitions.

V.

TEXAS SHOULD ADOPT STANDARDS

OF COMPETENCY

Because the first habeas application is "essentially the only opportunity a condemned inmate has for habeas review of his confinement
200. See, e.g., Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 106 n.6, 107 (claiming that the original habeas
counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to include in initial writ allegations that the state suppressed vital evidence); Exparte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 415-16
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (restating Kerr's argument that the original habeas attorney
did not provide effective assistance because the initial writ raised no constitutional or
jurisdictional claims concerning the fundamental fairness of trial).
201. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(d) (Vernon Supp. 2003);
e.g., Graves, at 113, 115 n.48 (refusing to read section 5(a) as referring to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise legal claims in an earlier habeas
writ).
202. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5(e); e.g., Graves, at 113, 115
n.48 (refusing to read section 5(a) as referring to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to raise factual claims in an earlier habeas writ).
203. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 115 n.48; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071,
§ 5(a), (d).
204. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117 (stating that allegations of ineffective assistance of
habeas counsel are a "gateway" device that would allow petitioners "to resurrect a
procedurally defaulted claim which he failed to bring at the proper time").
205. See Robbins, supra note 90, at 48-49.
206. See id. at 48.
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and death sentence,' 20 7 appointed counsel who assists him in preparing that application must be qualified. 20 8 Accordingly, article 11.071
mandates the appointment of "competent" post-conviction counsel
for indigent capital petitioners. Unfortunately, the statute negates
that concession by maintaining no binding qualification standards. °9
The Texas Legislature clearly intended for appointed counsel to provide competent representation in state habeas corpus proceedings;
however, it mistakenly relied on the court of criminal appeals to adopt
rules and standards governing the appointment of habeas counsel.210
Consequently, six years after the enactment of article 11.071, no standards of competency have been developed.
While the court of criminal appeals may have promulgated its own
standards of competence, it has failed to articulate those standards to
guide convicting courts in appointing attorneys on post-conviction review under article 11.071 section 2(d). 2 1 ' Because only a precise,
structured definition of "competent" will maintain the integrity of the
Texas habeas corpus statute, legislative action is necessary to effectively provide one full, fair, and final review of death convictions and
sentences. The Texas Legislature should amend article 11.071 to include mandatory standards of competency for post-conviction counsel.
If the statute were amended in this way, convicting courts would be
able to appoint competent counsel who would thoroughly investigate
and present all available factual and legal claims, and capital habeas
petitioners would have little or no need to file subsequent writs claiming ineffective assistance of habeas counsel.2 1 2 Finally, the suggested
criteria would fulfill the legislature's intent to provide quality representation on post-conviction habeas review.
A.

Statutory ConstructionAnalysis of Article 11.071

Statutory construction analysis illustrates that the Texas Legislature
clearly intended for counsel appointed under article 11.071 section
2(a) to be "competent. ' 21 3 In ascertaining the nature and scope of the
provision of competent counsel under article 11.071, the statutory con207. Ex parte Murphy, 917 S.W.2d 28, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (Baird, J.,
dissenting).
208. See Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 121 (Price, J., dissenting) (arguing that without a
requirement that counsel be qualified, "[t]he appointment of counsel is
meaningless").
209. See Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 119.
210. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 2003);
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
211. Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has failed to develop adequate standards to ensure appointment of competent counsel), vacated in part by 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997).
212. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 121 (Price, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 129-30 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (noting that the legislature intended
article 11.071 to guarantee that a death-row inmate will have "competent counsel" to
assist in preparing "his one application").
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struction analysis begins with the statute's plain language,2 1 4 which
states that "[a]n applicant shall be represented by competent coun-

sel."' 215 If a term in the statute is not defined, it should be given its

plain and ordinary meaning,2 1 6 and extratextual factors may be considered only if the statute's language is ambiguous. 217 Finally, because
all words are presumed to have been used by the legislature for a pur-

pose, each word contained in the statute must be given effect if
possible.2 18
The plain language of article 11.071 shows the legislature intended

to provide more than merely adequate lawyers on capital post-conviction review. 219 By using the modifier "competent" in connection with

"counsel," the Texas Legislature clearly intended for capital habeas
applicants to be represented in an initial habeas corpus proceeding by
qualified lawyers who have sufficient legal knowledge and skills.2 2 °
Because article 11.071 does not define the word "competent," statu-

tory construction analysis allows reliance on dictionary definitions.22 '
Thus, a "competent" attorney is one who possesses "[a] basic or minimal ability to do something; qualification" and "[t]he mental ability to
understand problems and make decisions. "222

Further, the legislature's use of the word "shall" in section 2(a) indicates that the provision of competent counsel is mandatory.2 2 3 While
the use of "shall" may sometimes be construed as either permissive or
mandatory, the word must be given the meaning that will best express
the legislature's intent.22 4 A review of the legislative history of article
11.071 illustrates that the Texas Legislature intended to provide capi214. See Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (defining the
starting point of statutory analysis as the language of the statute itself).
215. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(a).
216. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that if the
meaning of the statutory text should have been plain to the legislators who voted on
it, the court will give effect to the plain meaning).
217. Id. at 785-86.
218. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that the court
should attempt to give effect to each word, phrase, and clause of a statute); Whitelaw
v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (stating that under a plain meaning inquiry, it is "generally presume[d] that every word in a statute has been used for
a purpose").
219. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that
the legislature consistently shows great interest in appointment of competent counsel
in habeas cases).
220. See id. at 130 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) ("Article 11.071's guarantee of 'competent counsel' would be a cruel joke if it did not comprehend the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.").
221. See Bingham v. State, 913 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding
that courts should focus on a common acceptance of "unspecialized" words in connection with the context in which they appear).
222. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (7th ed. 1999).
223. Cf. Brinkley v. State, 320 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) ("'Must' and
'shall' are synonymous and are usually mandatory when used in statutes.").
224. Id.
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tal petitioners with the mandatory assistance of qualified, competent
counsel in preparing their post-conviction writs of habeas corpus,
225 Reprethereby ensuring they receive one full "'bite at the apple.' ,,
sentative Pete Gallego, the House sponsor of the legislation that became article 11.071, affirmed in a May 1995 House floor debate that
the legislative intent was to ensure adequate representation and review of capital post-conviction cases.2 2 6 Representative Gallego
stated,
[W]e tell individuals [in this statute] that everything you can possibly raise the first time, we expect you to raise it initially, one bite of
the apple, one shot .... If you have to stick the kitchen sink in

there, put it all in there, and we will go through those claims one at
a time and make a decision ....The idea is this: You're going to be
able to fund counsel in these instances, and we are going to give
you
227
one very well-represented run at a habeas corpus proceeding.

Accordingly, the court of criminal appeals recognized that article
11.071 rests on the premise that a capital inmate has "one full and fair
opportunity to present his [habeas claims]. 2 28
Finally, in interpreting a statute, it must be presumed that the legislature included every word in the statute for a purpose, and a court
should give effect to each word used. 2 9 Thus, the legislature's inclusion of the word "competent" in the death-penalty habeas corpus writ
scheme illustrates its intent to ensure qualified assistance of counsel
on post-conviction review. Because only trial and direct appellate
counsel are subject to the constitutional standard of "reasonably effective assistance, '23 ° the legislature knew it was necessary to specify the
type of representation required by habeas counsel. Significantly,
when the legislature recently enacted the Texas Fair Defense Act,231 it
did not qualify the statutory provisions for appointing counsel at trial
225. See Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)
(considering legislative debates in the House to determine legislative intent for enactment of article 11.071 and concluding that even though the legislature was limiting a
convicted individual to "'one bite at the apple,"' "they clearly contemplated that that
bite would be a full one").
226. Id. at 474 (quoting Debate on Tex. S.B. 440 on the floor of the House, 74th
Leg., R.S. (1995)).
227. Debate on Tex. S.B. 440 on the floor of the House, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995)
(statement of Representative Gallego) (emphasis added), quoted in Ex parte Graves,
70 S.W.3d 103, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Holcomb, J., dissenting).
228. Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
229. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
230. See Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1974); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) ("Any person haled into court ... cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
231. Texas Fair Defense Act, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
1800, 1800-01 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
1.051 (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
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with the term "competent. 2 32 Therefore, statutory construction analysis illustrates the legislature intended that appointed post-conviction
habeas counsel provide competent, well-qualified representation.
If the legislature amended article 11.071 to include mandatory statutory criteria describing the qualifications required for appointment
of habeas counsel, it would fulfill the intent to provide "competent"
counsel on post-conviction habeas review. Further, such an amendment would simplify the appointment process and provide the convicting courts with the guidance they need in making such
appointments.2 3 3 Texas should follow the lead of other states and
amend article 11.071 to provide statutory direction in the appointment
of "competent" counsel on post-conviction review.2 3 4 Such action will
not only provide the necessary standards of competency to administer
the appointment scheme, it will also remove judicial discretion in
making such appointments, reduce the number of successive writs attempting to claim ineffective assistance of habeas counsel, and infuse
2 35
the habeas corpus scheme of review with certainty and consistency.
B.

Suggested Criteriafor Appointing "Competent" Counsel

To ensure that statutorily mandated post-conviction counsel is
"competent," the underlying goal of the statutory criteria must be the
establishment of "minimum eligibility requirements designed to provide highly qualified and dedicated attorneys to . . . capitally sentenced individuals. ' 236 To meet this goal, the Texas Legislature should
follow the American Bar Association's recommendations for statutory
criteria regarding appointment of post-conviction counsel. 237 Those
recommendations address the following general areas: (1) the number
of years the attorney has been licensed to practice law; (2) the attorney's general level of experience; (3) the attorney's recent experience
representing clients in capital cases; (4) any specialized training or education in post-conviction capital habeas litigation; and (5) the attorney's demonstrated capability to perform at the advanced level
habeas practice, such as recent successful trials
required by specialized
8
or appeals.

23

Competency standards based on the American Bar Association's
proposed general criteria emphasize a habeas lawyer's experience
with other cases instead of his or her performance in the present case,
and they assume that specialized training will inevitably lead to com232. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (mandating that "[a] defendant in
a criminal matter is entitled to be represented by counsel in an adversarial judicial
proceeding").
233. Robbins, supra note 90, at 18-19.
234. See id. at 19.
235. See id. at 23.
236. Id. at 19.
237. See id. at 19 n.11.
238. Id. at 19-20.
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petent representation. 239 However, it is imperative for a statute that

provides for the appointment of post-conviction counsel to contain
provisions prescribing mandatory requirements for the competence of
that counsel. 240 Although an attorney who lacks the experience mandated by the statute may nevertheless be qualified to provide compe-

tent representation, the proposed criteria will do much more to carry
out the legislature's intent than Texas's current appointment practice,
which is based on no objective criteria at all.241 By providing the guidance that is currently lacking in the appointment of capital post-conviction counsel, the criteria will ensure that applicants receive

meaningful review of their death convictions by qualified counsel.
A survey of the capital post-conviction habeas statutes enacted by

other states provides further guidance for legislative action in Texas.
Notably, other than Texas, no states that provide for the mandatory
appointment of post-conviction counsel appear to qualify that appointment with the directive that such counsel be "competent.,

24 2

As

such, those state courts are not required to interpret the meaning and
extent of an undefined statutory guarantee. Of the numerous states
that statutorily mandate the appointment of counsel on capital postconviction habeas review, at least four enacted specific standards governing the qualifications of post-conviction counsel 24 3 which reflect
the proposed competency criteria outlined by the American Bar
Association.2 44

For example, Arizona's capital post-conviction habeas statute mandates that an attorney appointed to represent a death-row inmate on
state post-conviction review must, inter alia: (a) have practiced in the

239. Id.; see Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 119 (making the same argument against
similar statutory requirements).
240. Robbins, supra note 90, at 19.
241. See generally Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 114 n.45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The Graves court stated that the convicting courts should assess the professional competence of habeas counsel, and therefore, the Graves court refused to promulgate
rules or standards to guide in the determination of counsel's qualifications and abilities. See id. at 115 n.45; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2003).
242. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 32.5 cmt. ("Any petition for post-conviction relief
filed by a person under sentence of death shall result in the appointment of counsel."); ARK. R. CT. 16-91-202 ("If a capital conviction and sentence are affirmed on
direct appeal, the circuit court ... shall ... appoint[ ] counsel to represent the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding .... ); IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 44.2 ("Immediately
following the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge ... shall appoint at
least one attorney.., to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any postconviction remedy .... ); ILL. R. CRIM. P. 5/122-2.1 ("If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel ... the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied
that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel.").
243. See ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 6.8(c); CAL. R. CT. 76.6(e); IDAHO R. CRIM. P.
44.3(3)(b); TENN. R. Sup. Gr. 13(3)(h).
244. See Robbins, supra note 90, at 18-27 (discussing the suggested legislative plan
for states that want to adopt the ABA guidelines for appointment of competent
habeas counsel).
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area of state criminal appeals or post-conviction proceedings for at
least three years; (b) not have previously represented the capital defendant; (c) have been lead counsel in an appeal or post-conviction
proceeding in which a death sentence was imposed within three years
immediately preceding the appointment; (d) have attended and completed at least six hours of capital defense training or educational programs within one year prior to the appointment; and (e) generally
demonstrate the "proficiency and commitment which exemplify the
quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. "245
Similarly, California's capital post-conviction habeas statute follows
the suggested competency criteria by providing that a lawyer appointed as state habeas counsel must have at least the following qualifications: (a) practiced actively in that state for at least four years; (b)
served as counsel of record in five completed felony appeals or writ
proceedings; (c) completed at least nine hours of habeas corpus defense training within three years before the appointment; and (d)
demonstrated proficiency in research, analysis, writing, investigation,
and issue identification, determined by three writing samples submitted by the attorney.246
In Idaho, post-conviction appointed habeas "counsel must either
qualify as 'lead trial counsel"' under the statute, or meet the following
objective criteria: (a) familiarity with the rules and procedure of Idaho
appellate courts; (b) experience as a post-conviction practitioner with
at least three years spent in criminal litigation; (c) service as counsel in
a capital post-conviction case; (d) completion of twelve hours of training or educational programs; and (e) demonstration of proficiency and
commitment that "exemplify the quality of representation appropriate
to capital cases., 247 Also, in Tennessee, appointed capital post-conviction counsel must meet the following minimum qualifications: (a) experience in state post-conviction procedure; (b) a working knowledge
of habeas corpus practice, satisfied by six hours of specialized training;
and (c) three years of litigation experience in criminal trials and
appeals.248
Finally, in addition to providing statutory criteria for competency in
article 11.071, the Texas Legislature could go further and explicitly
disclaim any responsibility for the performance of appointed capital
post-conviction counsel.2 4 9 While some states specifically decline by
statute to allow claims alleging deficient performance by post-conviction habeas counsel,25 ° such "nullifying provisions" seem fundamen245. ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 6.8(c)(1)-(2).
246. CAL. R. CT. 76.6(e)(1)-(5)(A).
247. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 44.3(3)(b)(1).
248. TENN. R. Sup. CT. 13(3)(g), (h).
249. See Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 120.
250. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-201(3) (2001) (indicating that violation of
the appointment of competent counsel for post-conviction proceedings does not allow
a claim for post-conviction relief); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(c)(3) (2002) (mandat-
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tally unfair if the competency of such counsel has not first been
ensured by statutory criteria that includes qualifications for
appointment.2 5 '
VI.

CONCLUSION

Capital post-conviction review is a controversial and complex stage
of the capital appeals process. When a death-row inmate applies for
habeas corpus relief, he is no longer fighting to prove his innocence,
but instead he "is a legally guilty person. ' 252 Thus, a capital habeas
petitioner needs an attorney "not as a shield to protect him against
being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption
of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of
guilt."25' 3 Even so, no one would argue that indigent capital petitioners should be forced to risk having ill-prepared, inexperienced habeas
counsel appointed to represent them, thereby increasing the possibility that one might be executed without the benefit of an important
procedural safeguard.25 4
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that "a 'potted
plant' appointed as counsel is no better than no counsel at all.",255 Although the absence of adequate habeas representation deprives
death-sentenced prisoners of meaningful access to state post-conviction remedies, the answer is not bootstrapping a constitutional standard of effectiveness to a statutory right to counsel. Instead, the most
effective way to have qualified counsel available in death penalty

cases is to have a better system of selecting them. 256 First, under these

proposed criteria governing counsel's qualifications, the only time a
capital habeas application should be remanded to the habeas court is
ing that "a claim of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel [may not]
constitute good cause" to excuse the grounds for denial of a motion); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2953.21(I)(2) (Anderson Supp. 2001) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during proceedings under this section does not constitute grounds for
relief in a proceeding under this section."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.8(D) (Michie
Supp. 2002) ("The performance of habeas corpus counsel appointed pursuant to this
article shall not form a basis of relief in any subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.").
251. See Di Giulio, supra note 18, at 12-21.
252. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (White, J.,
dissenting).
253. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
254. See Robbins, supra note 90, at 21-22; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
1, 19-20, 24 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "high
incidence of uncorrected error [in capital cases] demonstrates that the meaningful
appellate review necessary in a capital case extends beyond the direct appellate process"); Bright, supra note 96, at 799 (reporting that death-row inmates have often
prevailed on post-conviction review by showing that they were either convicted or
sentenced to death in violation of the U.S. Constitution and also reporting that constitutional error was found in forty percent of 361 death sentences reviewed in postconviction proceedings between 1976 and 1991).
255. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 114.
256. Robbins, supra note 90, at 25-26.
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if the initial application is actually a "non-writ" because it raised no
constitutional or jurisdictional claims concerning the fairness of the
underlying trial or the accuracy of the verdict.2 57 Finally, this suggested amendment of article 11.071 would accomplish two important
goals. First, these proposed criteria would prevent unnecessary delay
in the post-conviction process by the appointment of competent, qualified habeas counsel, 258 and second, these proposed criteria would
guarantee that capital habeas petitioners receive their statutorily mandated "one full 'bite at the apple"' 2 59 for collateral review of their
conviction and sentence.
Julie B. Richardson-Stewart
257. Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 415-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that
applicant's first filing did not qualify as an initial application for a writ of habeas
corpus because that filing merely challenged the constitutionality of article 11.071, but
it did not challenge either his capital murder conviction or his death sentence).
258. See Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "undeniable outcome of condemned inmates receiving
competent counsel is an expedited habeas process").
259. See id. at 612-13.
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